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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the recent decision of the US Supreme Court in Obergefell et al v 
Hodges, Director Ohio Department of Health et al (2015) 576 US ----. By a majority of 5-4, 
the Court held that the liberty and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
either singly or in combination, prevented a State from prohibiting marriage between adult 
spouses of the same sex. The four dissentients rooted their dissents in the accusation that the 
majority has improperly arrogated to the Court jurisdiction over a matter that should be left 
to be resolved through State political processes. This paper critiques both the majority and 
dissenting opinions, and suggests that while one might applaud the substantive conclusion 
the Court has reached, the reasoning offered by the majority suffers from several obvious 
weaknesses. 
 
Note to editor. The hard copy official version of Obergefell is not yet available, so references in the text are to 
(2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at p1 etc.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 One need not have been blessed with atypical powers of prediction to appreciate that the US 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v Windsor, Executor of the Estate of Spyer ,1 would 
promptly lead the Court to consider the much more significant issue of whether States could 
refuse to recognise same-sex marriages.2 That question had last been put squarely before the 
Court over forty years ago, in Baker v Nelson,3 when it was summarily dismissed as raising 
                                                          
1
 (2013) 570 US ------; (2013) 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 
2
  See for example Archibald, “Is Full Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples Next - The Immediate and 
Future Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in the United States v. Windsor” (2014) 48 Valparaiso 
University Law Review 695:  Baude, “Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor” (2013) 8 
New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 150: Fuerst, “Means to an Inevitable End: How the United 
States v. Windsor and the Fall of the Defense of Marriage Act Will Accelerate Marriage Equality among All the 
States,” (2014) 8 Federal Courts Law Review 51. 
 
3
 (1972) 409 US 810. On appeal from the Supreme Court of Minnesota  (1971) 191 NW 2d 185; easily available 
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/library/documents/BakervNelson.pdf. The suit was a remarkably innovative 
endeavour, brought by two student activists a Mr Baker and a Mr McConnell; see Coyle, “The First Case: Forty 
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no constitutional issue. In Windsor, a 5-4 majority had concluded that s.3 of the Federal 
Defence of Marriage Act 1996 (DOMA) was inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment. S.3 was 
a broad interpretation clause, which provided that any reference to ‘marriage’ in federal 
legislation should be construed as referring only to marriages between a man and a woman. 
The effect of s.3 was to deny any benefits accruing to married couples under such legislation 
to same sex spouses. DOMA had been a pre-emptive strike against the possibility that some 
States might permit same sex marriages,4 and seems to have been enacted to give legislative 
force to majoritarian bigotry against homosexuals.5 It is a measure of how swiftly the cultural 
landscape in the USA has shifted in respect of sexual orientation discrimination that by the 
time Windsor came before the Court in 2103 a dozen States had legalised same sex marriage. 
 The majority judgment in Windsor invalidated s.3 on the basis that it infringed an individual 
liberty interest arising under the Fifth Amendment. That liberty was not for a person to marry 
another person of the same sex. DOMA did not purport to ‘ban’ such marriages, and save in 
Washington DC or the territories, Congress would have no such power in any event. The 
liberty in issue was an entitlement not to be denigrated, belittled and stigmatised by 
legislation motivated by moral disapproval of a person’s sexual orientation. The majority also 
accepted that the due process clause of the Fifth implicitly contained a proviso equivalent to 
the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth,6 and seemingly indicated - but did not 
expressly assert - that sexual orientation discrimination had now become a ‘suspect category’ 
for equal protection purposes such that it could only be justified by compelling public policy 
concerns (which did not and could not include simple moral disapproval). 
 Even as Windsor was decided, a cluster of challenges to the laws in several of the States 
which prohibited same-sex marriage had been making their respective ways through the State 
and/or federal court systems. Obergefell consolidated four of those cases, which respectively 
called into question the laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee. 
 The Tennessee law was contained in an amendment to the State constitution passed in 2006: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Years On’ (2010) National Law Journal 23 August. Minnesota legalised same-sex marriage in 2013. There is an 
intriguing ps to the claimant’s legal failure: 
 
“The couple, though, did not give up. With some sleight of hand involving a legal change to a gender-neutral 
name, they obtained a marriage license in another county, and in 1971, in white bell-bottom pantsuits and 
macramé headbands, they exchanged vows before a Methodist pastor and a dozen guests in a friend’s apartment. 
Their three-tiered wedding cake was topped by two plastic grooms, which a friend supplied by splitting two 
bride-and-groom figurines. Ever since, they have maintained that theirs was the country’s first lawful same-sex 
wedding. The state and federal governments have yet to grant recognition, but the pastor, Roger W. Lynn, 76, 
calls theirs “one of my more successful marriages. They are still happily married, and they love each other,” Mr. 
Lynn said”. See Eckholm, “The Same Sex Couple Who got a Marriage Licence in 1971” (2015) New York 
Times 15 May; available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/us/the-same-sex-couple-who-got-a-marriage-
license-in-1971.html?_r=0 
 
4
 Massachusetts was the first to do so, albeit by judicial construction of the State constitution rather than 
legislation: see Goodridge v Dept of Public Health (2003) 789 N. E. Ed 2d 941. For contemporaneous analysis 
see Duncan, “How Brown Is Goodridge - The Appropriation of a Legal Icon” (2004) 14 
Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 27. 
 
5
 See the discussion of the Congressional debates in Loveland, ‘A Right to Engage in Same Sex Marriage in the 
USA’ European Human Rights LR 10 at pp 12-13: Butler, “The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of 
Narrative in the Debate Over Same Sex Marriage’ (1997) 73 New York University Law Review 841. 
 
6
 Following the Warren Court’s lead in Bolling v Sharpe - (1954) 347 US 397 - which contemporaneously with 
Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483 – invalidated racial segregation in Washington DC schools. 
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The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one man and one woman shall be the 
only legally recognized marital contract in this state. Any policy or law or judicial interpretation, purporting to 
define marriage as anything other than the historical institution and legal contract between one man and one 
woman is contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be void and unenforceable in Tennessee….  
 
Constitutional amendment in Tennessee requires that a measure twice be passed in both 
houses of the legislature in successive sessions (by a bare majority on the first occasion and 
by a two thirds majority in the second) and then approved by a referendum.7 Some 81% of 
voters in the referendum supported the amendment. It could hardly be said therefore that the 
measure was the result of a transient, bare majoritarian legislative whim. Quite what motives 
underlay the amendment at the referendum stage is essentially unknowable, given that the 
overwhelming majority of the ‘lawmakers’ have not expressed any recorded view to explain 
why they voted as they did. One might however surmise that many of the good people 
Tennessee subscribed to - at least in the secluded anonymity of the ballot box – the 
presumption so prevalent in the late twentieth century United States that homosexuality ought 
to be designated as a deviant and inferior form of sexual orientation.8 
 The same conclusion presumably applied to Kentucky’s 2004 constitutional amendment 
which affirmed the previously legislative basis of the cross-gender nature of marriage:9 
 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A 
legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized. 
 
 The Kentucky constitution is not so deeply entrenched as that of Tennessee. Amendment 
requires the support of three fifths of the members of each of the two legislative houses, and 
then approval by a bare majority in a referendum.10 Some 74% of Kentucky voters supported 
the proposal to prohibit same-sex marriage.11  
 The Michigan State legislature had prohibited same-sex marriages in 1995. The ‘people’ of 
the State then amended the State constitution in 2004: 
 
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union 
of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union 
for any purpose. 
 
 The terms of Michigan’s constitution are not deeply entrenched. Article XII of the State 
constitution12 provides for amendment of the constitution by majority support in a 
                                                          
7
 Art IX section 3; http://www.capitol.tn.gov/about/docs/TN-Constitution.pdf at p21. 
 
8
 The extraordinary vitriol which motivated many anti-gay marriage campaigns in the early 2000s is chronicled 
in Cahill, “The Anti-Gay Marriage Movement” in Rimmerman and Wilcox, The Politics of Same Sex Marriage 
(2007). Much of the impetus came from evangelical protestant sects, although one might note that many 
avowedly religious Americans were vocal supporters of same sex marriage; see Cahill op. cit and “Religious 
Coaltions For and Against Gay Marriage: the Culture War Rages On”, in Rimmerman and Wilcox op. cit. 
 
9
 See especially Riggle and Rotosky, “The Consequences of Marriage Policy For Same-Sex Couples’ 
Wellbeing” pp 75-78, in Rimmerman and Wilcox op. cit. 
 
10
 Constitution of the State of Kentucky section 256; available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/ib59.pdf 
 
11
 For a snapshot of the motives of ‘Yes’ voters see inter, alia, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-ky-initiative-gay-marriage_x.htm; 
 
12
 http://www.legislature.mi.gov/%28S%28ezcspdnkw5ft3loqteva2gzt%29%29/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-
chap1.pdf; 
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referendum approving either a proposal supported by two thirds of the members of the State 
legislature or a proposal supported in a petition by 10% of the electorate. The 2004 
amendment was a petition initiative, which was supported at the referendum stage by a vote 
of 59% to 41%.13 
 On the same day,14 voters in Ohio approved a similar amendment to their State’s constitution 
by a 62% - 38% majority:15  
 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its 
political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage 
 
The amendment lent further legal force to the sentiments enacted the previous year by the 
State legislature in a Defence of Marriage Act. 
 In all four States the issue continued to be contested in the political arena. But Windsor 
provided the trigger for the argument to move into the courts, prompting litigants to begin 
proceedings in the federal District Courts.16 While all of the Obergefell petitioners succeeded 
in their respective federal District courts, their cases were consolidated by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in DeBoer v Snyder ,17 in which the court concluded that the States were not 
under any constitutional obligation to permit same sex marriage. The Eighth Circuit issued a 
similar judgment in Citizens for Equal Protection v Bruning.18 In so doing, the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits reached a quite different conclusion from that arrived at in other circuits. 
One might have thought that the most doctrinally defensible way to invalidate the various 
State laws would have been to hold that: (a) the laws classified people according to their 
sexual orientation; (b) the classification had a discriminatory effect as it deprived gay people 
- and their children - of the various legal and financial (and perhaps 
cultural/moral/reputational) benefits enjoyed by married (as opposed to cohabiting) couples;19 
(c) that sexual orientation discrimination was a suspect category for equal protection purposes 
and thus subject to strict or heightened scrutiny; (d) there was no compelling public policy 
reason to justify such discrimination. On this rationale, marriage per se would be a secondary 
or derivative issue: the true question would be the acceptable bounds of State sponsored 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
13
 http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/ 
 
14
 2004 was an especially busy year for anti-gay marriage initiatives; see the discussion and analysis in Lofton 
and Haider-Markel, “The Politics of Same Sex Marriage Versus the Politics of Gay Civil Rights”, in 
Rimmerman and Wilcox op. cit.  
 
15
 Ibid. Amendment to the Ohio constitution requires (per Art XVI) the support of three fifths of each house of 
the legislature for a proposed amendment which is then put to the voters in a referendum. A bare majority of 
votes in favour is required to give legal effect to the proposal; https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/laws/ohio-
constitution/section?const=16.01 
 
16
 For a helpful summary of the multiplicity of suits see Cruz, “Baker v. Nelson: Flotsam in the Tidal Wave of 
Windsor's Wake” (2015) 3 Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality 184. 
 
17
 (2014) 772 F 3d 388. 
 
18
 (2014) 455 F. 3d 859.  
 
19
 On the variegated reasons why same-sex couples in the USA might wish to marry see especially Goldberg, 
“Why Marriage?” (2012) in Garrison and Scott (eds) Marriage at the Crossroads. 
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sexual orientation discrimination. Insofar as such a technique would demand judicial 
innovation, that innovation would be limited to making explicit what was obviously implicit 
in Windsor and arguably implicit in the earlier sexual orientation discrimination judgments in 
Romer v Evans20 and Lawrence v Texas.21 
 This was the approach taken by the Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit in Baskin v Bogan22 in 
September 2014 when it invalidated the opposite-gender-only marriage laws of Indiana and 
Wisconsin, albeit that the Court also concluded that the laws could not even pass rational 
basis scrutiny. The same method was followed by the majority of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Latta v Otter,23 a judgment which rested on the court’s own judgment 
earlier in 2014 in SmithKline Beecham Copt v Abbott Labs24 that Windsor demanded that 
sexual orientation be treated as a suspect category. 
 In contrast, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Bostic v Scahefer 25 invalidated 
Virginia’s constitutional provision that “only a union between one man and one woman may 
be a marriage valid in…. this Commonwealth” on the basis that marriage between two 
consenting adults was a liberty interest under the Fourteenth which could only be abridged by 
State law satisfying the strict scrutiny test and that Virginia’s law did not pass the test. A 
similar approach was taken by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kitchen v Herbert26 in 
relation to Utah and Oklahoma laws, albeit that the court also indicated that suspect category 
equal protection analysis would apply.  
 All of the circuit courts which invalidated the respective State laws had placed significant 
emphasis on Windsor as a guide to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in respect of 
this issue. The weight of circuit court opinion and the fact that the Windsor majority remained 
in place pointed toward a Supreme Court reversal of the Sixth Circuit in Obergefell. 
 
 
The majority judgment 
 
 As in Windsor, the majority judgment in Obergefell was authored by Kennedy, and joined - 
without any separate concurring opinions – by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayer and Kagan JJ.  
The judgment invalidated the laws of all four of the respondent States. While the majority 
certainly gave some weight to an equal protection analysis of the issue, the judgment seems 
to be rooted primarily in the conclusion that the right to marry is a liberty issue which entitles 
                                                          
20
 (1996) 517 US 620. 
 
21
 (2003) 539 US 558. 
 
22
 (2014) 766 F. 3d 648;  http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1677242.html;. The sole judgment is 
authored by Richard Posner. It is lucidly and trenchantly dismissive of the States’ various attempts to justify 
their laws: “…[S]o full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously” (at -----); [T]he grounds advanced by Indiana 
and Wisconsin are not only conjectural; they are totally implausible”; (at ----). 
 
23
 (2014) 771 F.3d 456. 
 
24
 (2014) 740 F. 3d 471; http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000692;. Abbot was an ant-
trust case involving medicines used in HIV treatment in which one party, Abott, exercised a peremptory right to 
exclude a juror for no discernible reason other than that he was gay. 
 
25
 http://www.uscourts.gov/courts/ca4/141167.P.pdf 
 
26
 (2014) 755 F. 3d 1193. 
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any and all adults to marry whichever other adult he/she might wish, subject only to State 
regulation which could pass muster under strict scrutiny review.27 
 
 
A liberty issue…… 
 
 Part II of the judgment28 dwells briefly on the centrality of marriage as a social institution in 
all known societies. Kennedy J is keen to portray marriage as an evolving or dynamic social 
institution, in terms both of the reasons for entering it and its legal effects on the participants 
(emphases added): 
“For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrangement by the couple’s parents based on political, 
religious, and financial concerns; but by the time of the Nation’s founding it was understood to be a voluntary 
contract between a man and a woman. See N. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 9–17 
(2000); S. Coontz, Marriage, A History 15–16 (2005). As the role and status of women changed, the institution 
further evolved. Under the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, a married man and woman were treated by the 
State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 430 
(1765). As women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society began to understand that women 
have their own equal dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned…. These and other developments in the 
institution of marriage over the past centuries were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked deep 
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential…... “.29 
 The stress on the evolving nature of marriage was presumably laid in anticipation of the 
argument that the ‘liberties’ embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment comprised only those 
issues that could be said to have a clear and longstanding empirical root in the fabric of 
American life, and since same-sex marriage dated only back to 2003 – and then only in 
Massachusetts – it could not have that character. The thrust of Kennedy J’s analysis seems to 
be to assert that the gender identity of spouses is an ‘aspect’ - and a ‘deep’ aspect – of the 
traditional understanding of marriage, but not an indispensable element of it. This proposition 
might have been argued more fully and been more deeply grounded in empirical study. For 
example, the sub-title of the Coontz book referred to is ‘How Love Conquered Marriage’. 
The book is a sweeping, cross-cultural historical survey of marriage. Kennedy’s reference to 
it is rather skimpy, and might more helpfully have focused on chapters 15-17, which trace 
developments in the USA in the post-1945 era, and make a credible case for the proposition 
that a – if not the – dominant motive for marriage in the near modern era lies in a reciprocal 
desire for companionship and emotional intimacy rather than child-rearing.30 
 The next section of Part II runs with the notion of changing understandings of ‘equal dignity’ 
in relation to the traditionally subordinate status of women vis a vis men and applies it to 
recent attitudinal changes in modern American society to homosexuality:  
 
“Until the mid-20th century, same-sex intimacy long had been condemned as immoral by the state itself in most 
Western nations, a belief often embodied in the criminal law. For this reason, among others, many persons did 
                                                          
27
 Which presumably – at least at present – leaves it open to States to retain restrictions based on age, mental 
competence, consanguinity and polygamy. 
 
28
 Part I very briefly recounts the history of the litigation. 
 
29
 (2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at p6. Similarly ‘deep transformations’ perhaps, not mentioned by 
Kennedy J, would be the substantial facilitation of divorce and radical alternations in legal presumptions as to 
the distribution of financial assets and custody of children when divorce occurs... 
 
30
 Coontz’s 1997 book, The Way We Really Are, is perhaps a similarly useful source on the empirically ill-
founded notion of the composition of the ‘traditional’ American family. 
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not deem homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct identity…. Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in 
many States…. 
 For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was treated as an illness….Only in more recent years 
have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality 
and immutable…..”.31 
 
 This dynamic is portrayed as manifesting itself in culture and politics and law: 
 
“In the late 20th century, following substantial cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to 
lead more open and public lives and to establish families. This development was followed by a quite extensive 
discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater 
tolerance.[32]As a result, questions about the rights of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where the issue 
could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law. 
This Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal status of homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 
186 (1986). There it upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia law deemed to criminalize certain homosexual 
acts. Ten years later, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) , the Court invalidated an amendment to 
Colorado’s Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or political subdivision of the State from protecting 
persons against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Then, in 2003, the Court overruled Bowers, holding 
that laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U. S. 558.”.33 
 
 Part III seeks to identify ‘dignity and autonomy’ as values synonymous with liberty under 
the Fourteenth. Kennedy J’s opinion speeds through bits of the celebrated 1960s 
contraception cases34 which in part underpinned the majority judgment in Roe v Wade.35 
Kennedy does not invoke Roe here however. This implicit recasting of the organising 
principle in the contraception cases as one concerned with ‘dignity and autonomy’ rather than 
‘privacy’ involves something of a linguistic sleight of hand. There are six judgments in 
Griswold. The term ‘dignity’ appears once – in Douglas J’s majority opinion. It appears once 
in Poe – in Harlan J.’s dissent. In the latest of the three cases, Eisenstadt, it is not used at all. 
 Kennedy J then carries this couplet of dignity and autonomy into a trio of ‘marriage cases’ in 
which State prohibitions on marriage were struck down. The first, chronological and in the 
judgment, is the Warren Court’s well known (unanimous) opinion in Loving v Virginia:36 the 
second and third are the more obscure decisions in Zablocki v Redhail37 and Turner v 
Saffley.38 In Loving, the Warren Court invalidated Virginia’s racial discriminatory marriage 
laws, which forbade marriage between a white and non-white person; Zablocki held that 
Wisconsin’s law which prevented fathers who defaulted on child support payments from 
                                                          
31
 (2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at pp 7-8. 
 
32
 Kennedy J did not invoke any social science evidence on the point. Helpful sources are Brewer, “The Shifting 
Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights” (2003) 65 The Journal of Politics 1208; “Values, Political 
Knowledge and Public Opinion About Gay Rights” (2003) 67 Public Opinion Quarterly 173. 
 
33
 (2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at p8. 
 
34
 Poe v Ullman (1961) 367 US 497: Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479: Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405 
US 438. 
 
35
 (1973) 410 US 113. Mention of Roe was presumably eschewed out of a concern that it would further fan the 
flames of political controversy that the same-sex marriage question was already generating. 
  
36
 (1967) 388 US 1. 
 
37
 (1978) 434 US 374. 
 
38
 (1987) 482 US 78. 
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marrying was unconstitutional ; while Turner took the same approach  towards a Missouri 
law which precluded any prison inmate from marrying unless the prison governor considered 
there were compelling reasons to allow the inmate to do so.                                               
 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the majority in Obergefell is playing rather fast and 
loose with the respective ratios of the three ‘marriage case’ judgments in invoking all of them 
as a support for the notion that the ‘fundamental’ characteristic of marriage is indifferent to 
the gender(s) of the participants. Thus, for example, Kennedy J asserts [18] “Loving did not 
ask about a right to inter-racial marriage”.39 Unhappily, perhaps, this contention is manifestly 
incorrect. Most of the judgment in Loving is directed towards equal protection issues. But in 
respect of the liberty element of the Fourteenth Amendment the Court unequivocally couched 
its analysis in the language of a right to inter-racial marriage: 
 
“…..The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men…. 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these 
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, 
and cannot be infringed by the State”. 
 
 Similarly, Kennedy J asserts that: “Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’” 
[18].40 But – very clearly – Turner did just that (emphases added): 
 
“The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a result of incarceration. 
Many important attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the limitations imposed by 
prison life. First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. 
These elements Page 482 U. S. 96 are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, 
many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some inmates and their spouses, 
therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal 
dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most inmate 
marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital status 
often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., 
tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born 
out of wedlock). These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the marriage 
commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals”.41 
 
 As to Zablocki, this case: “did not ask about a right of fathers with unpaid child support 
duties to marry”.42 Once again, the assertion is hard to defend, giving that the clinching factor 
in the majority judgment appeared to be the concern that some ‘deadbeat dads’ would never 
be able to marry as their poverty would permanently preclude them from meeting their child 
support obligations: 
 
“….Some of those in the affected class, like appellee, will never be able to obtain the necessary court order, 
because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children 
will not become public charges. These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married. Many others, able 
                                                          
39
 (2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at p18. 
 
40
 Ibid. 
 
41
 (1987) 482 US 78 at 95-96 
 
42
 (2015) 576 US ----; judgment of Kennedy J at p18. 
(2017) British Journal of American Legal Studies 
 
9 
 
in theory to satisfy the statute's requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will, in 
effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”.43 
 All three cases were of course decided in eras when – on the majority’s own argument – 
being homosexual was to be part of a stigmatised and marginalised minority. It is easy to 
suggest that they therefore offer no support for the substance of Kennedy J’s conclusion. But 
that suggestion misses – or perhaps deliberately ignores the crucial point. The ‘marriage 
cases’ are perhaps less concerned with the right to marry per se as with the States’ limited 
capacity to deprive a person of aspects of her/his individuality; that he she is not deserving of 
the full panoply of individual rights because (per Loving) she/he is black or (per Turner) 
she/he is a prisoner or (per Zablocki) he/she is an indigent parent. A denial of a fundamental 
right is a particularistic manifestation of a broader liberty value; to be recognised by law as an 
individual. 
  Thus we might conclude that discriminatory anti-gay laws (as to employment, or private 
sexual conduct, or public displays of affection) laws rested on the legislative premise that 
their targets were not ‘individuals’ in the full sense, but a lesser breed of person properly 
excludable from some of the manifestations of liberty enjoyed by ‘normal’ people. This is a 
point developed further below in relation to part of the dissenting judgment offered by Chief 
Justice Roberts.  
  It is very noticeable in Obergefell that while the majority makes copious references to 
previous Court decisions, it rarely quotes from any of them at any length. A short passage 
from Griswold is invoked (perhaps to underline the point that even fifty years ago marriage 
was recognised as having a value beyond child-rearing):44 
 
“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a 
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any 
involved in our prior decisions. ”  
 
 As a technique, this is quite curious. One might initially suppose this is because - as alluded 
to above – any extensive quotation would undermine the majority’s liberty argument. But that 
is certainly not the case. Consider, for example, the following passage in Zablocki, which 
roots the right to marry within the broader right of an individual’s entitlement to privacy,45 a 
concept which is readily understandable as gender-indifferent: 
“Cases subsequent to Griswold and Loving have routinely categorized the decision to marry as among the 
personal decisions protected by the right of privacy. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 429 U. S. 598-
600, and nn. 23-26 (1977). For example, last Term, in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 
(1977), we declared: 
"While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that 
among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal 
decisions 'relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 388 U. S. 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 
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405 U. S. 453-454; id. at 405 U. S. 460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510,. 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390, 262 U. S. 399 (1923)]."  
Id.. at 431 U. S. 684-685, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 152-153 (1973). See also Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 414 U. S. 639-640 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that 
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 431 
U. S. 842-844 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 431 U. S. 499 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 
693, 424 U. S. 713 (1976)”.46 
The final paragraph of this passage might be the most helpful to the majority’s argument 
(emphasis added): 
“It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions 
relating to procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it 
would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with 
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society”.47 
  There is an obvious danger that the copious citation of authority without any extensive, 
textually rooted consideration of that authority would expose the majority’s conclusion to the 
charge that it is essentially creating rather than discovering particular ‘liberties’ , and as such 
is overstepping the limits of its proper constitutional role. We return to this point below. It is 
therefore perhaps unfortunate that Kennedy J felt the need to engage with liberty issues at all, 
given that his judgment could have rested on what seems to have been regarded by the 
majority as a secondary ground – that of equal protection. 
 
 
…..and/or an equal protection issue  
 
 In Windsor, the majority had held that the Fifth Amendment contained an implied equal 
protection proviso and – more broadly – that the two concepts would often be so entangled 
that a breach on one basis would necessarily entail breach of the other. Kennedy J seems to 
have followed a similar path in Obergefell, observing that there is a ‘synergy’ between the 
two concepts. The crucial passage on the equal protection point is however rather cursory: 
 
“[T]he marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are 
denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental 
right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex 
couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on 
gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them….”.48 
 
 It might have been helpful if at this juncture the majority has spelled in considerably more 
detail just what the ‘benefits’ is issue were, and in what respects same-sex partners were 
disrespected and subordinated. Kennedy J touched briefly on these points in Part I of the 
judgment, but they were not drawn out at any length. The only issue raised in relation to Mr 
Obergefell – whose partner had died – was that he could not register as the surviving spouse 
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on his partner’s death certificate. That is not the weightiest of issues. The point noted under 
Michigan law was arguably much more substantial; gay couples could adopt children only as 
individuals, not as (unlike a married man/woman) a couple. Thus if the adopter partner died, 
the surviving partner would have no legal custodial rights vis a vis the deceased partner’s 
adoptive children. No ‘tangible’ equal protection issues were highlighted raise at all in 
respect of Tennessee and Kentucky. Nor did Kennedy J make anything significant of the 
deleterious effects on same sex couples of the ‘disapproval’ to which he referred. Similarly, 
the majority made nothing of the point that the State laws also forbade the creation or 
recognition of any form of civil partnership that would grant same sex couples the tangible 
benefits bestowed on married couples. For the lawmaking majorities in those States ‘separate 
and unequal’ was evidently the proper moral position. 
 The balance of the majority judgment is certainly shaped to some extent by the way that the 
various cases joined in Obergefell were pleaded and argued in the lower federal courts. Those 
pleadings and arguments do appear to owe rather more to a liberty than to an equal protection 
analysis of the issue, but it is unfortunate that the majority did not rest its judgment (much) 
more firmly on an equal protection basis. Had it done so, it might have reduced the 
significance of the most problematic part of its decision. 
 
 
On the separation of powers  
 
 Perhaps the most peculiar self-inflicted wound that the majority deals to the legitimacy of its 
conclusion is this sentence in Part IV of the judgment:49  
 
“Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that 
process does not abridge fundamental rights”. 
 
 The notion that ‘fundamental rights’50 and ‘democracy’ can ever be values that are at odds 
with each other is extraordinary in the American context, and invites the obvious accusation 
that the Court is acting in an ‘undemocratic’ fashion.  A better form of words to set the scene 
in Part IV of the judgment would surely have been: 
 
“Of course, the understanding of democracy enshrined in our Constitution contemplates that majoritarian 
lawmaking through State or Congressional measures is the appropriate process for change, so long as those 
measures do not abridge fundamental rights. Our democracy has always envisaged that the courts will protect 
fundamental rights against legislative interference”. 
 
 The unhappy nature of the majority’s phraseology becomes clearer when Kennedy J goes on 
just a few lines later to invoke the classic modern judicial formulation of the way in which 
the constitution reconciles understandings of ‘democracy’ and fundamental rights – Jackson 
J’s speech in West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette.51 This is perhaps where the 
majority should have more starkly staked out and clearly articulated its ground: that there is 
more to the notion of ‘democracy’ than legal deference to electoral politics. 
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 One might assume that the majority includes the notion of equal protection as an element of ‘fundamental 
rights’. 
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  The argument is admittedly difficult to carry on the same sex marriage issue simply because 
so many States wished to forbid it. A recurrent and contentious element of the Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence in the modern era has been the use of State head counting as an aide to 
assessing the continued constitutionality of death penalty legislation. The technique was first 
deployed shortly after Furman v Georgia52 in Coker v Georgia ,53 when the Court felt able to 
conclude that imposing the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman was cruel and 
unusual punishment because only one State did it. Subsequent use of the counting method in 
death penalty cases has been far more contentious.54 
 This in part because it can be portrayed as back door route to constitutional amendment. A 
rule of constitutional law resting (wholly or in substantial part) on a head count which 
comprises fewer than the three quarters of States whose assent is required for constitutional 
amendment has dubious legitimacy in quantitative substantive terms. Procedural concerns 
also blend in with matters of substance. Voting behaviour (whether of electors or legislators) 
in States may be significantly affected by the normative nature of ‘the law’ being voted upon. 
Individuals may be more willing to support (or be less likely to oppose) a new law intended 
to affect only a particular State, and which could quite easily be changed within the State in 
future than, a law intended to amend the Constitution.55 
 Relatedly, the practice is obviously problematic insofar as it can be portrayed as shutting 
down political debate. If the court has declared a particular sentencing policy 
unconstitutional, then the pro-policy minority cannot increase to a majority; indeed it 
disappears altogether.  Movement from the status quo would require the court to change its 
collective mind or – a most unlikely proposition - that the requisite majorities suddenly and 
then sustainably appear in both Congress and the States for the constitutional amendment 
expressly permitting the policy to be applied. 
 There is no express mention of head counting jurisprudence in Kennedy’s opinion. The 
technique could presumably have no legitimacy as a source of constitutional law if only a 
dozen States recognise same-sex marriage, while nearly forty prohibit it.  And it is perhaps 
around this question of numbers that the majority judgment faces its greatest difficulty. 
  Even before Windsor, same-sex marriage as a purely ‘political’ as opposed to 
‘constitutional’ issue56 was being vigorously argued in most of the States. Windsor lent those 
arguments sharper focus. But one could hardly suggest the arguments – as political arguments 
-were resolved. There is no popular ‘majority’ favouring same sex marriage. The prohibitory 
laws of Ohio and Tennessee and Michigan and Kentucky cannot be denied constitutional 
validity on the basis that they are aberrant departures from a widely accepted norm. The crux 
of the majority view must be that the norm itself is an aberrant departure from the 
understanding of democracy that the constitution exists to protect. 
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  (1972) 408 US 238. 
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 (1977) 433 US 584. 
 
54
 See for example Ford v Wainwright (1983) 477 U.S. 399: Atkins v Virginia (1989) 492 U.S. 302. 
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 Either because the voter recognises that the law may turn out to have less desirable effects than she hopes, or 
that her own views might evolve, in which events she might wish the law to be changed; or that she does not 
think it proper for voters in States which do not share her view to be obliged to do so.  
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 That premise is diluted, or perhaps obscured, by an odd passage at the start of part IV of 
Kennedy’s judgment which seems to say that because there has been a great deal of political 
argument on the question, in all sorts of ways and all sorts of fora, an ‘enhanced 
understanding of the issue’57 has emerged; which understanding legitimises the court’s 
intervention – on the side of those possessed of this ‘enhanced understanding’. This passage 
lends itself to the interpretation that the majority is simply turning (a primitive conception of) 
democracy upside down, and allowing a minority political viewpoint to trump a majoritarian 
one.  
 That perception may be reinforced by the very cursory attention the majority gave to the 
(purported) policy arguments offered by the States to support their respective laws. [26] 
Kennedy J simply dismisses as ‘counterintuitive’ the assertion that same sex marriage would 
harm marriage as an institution because it would deter opposite gender couples from 
marrying. A more fully reasoned rebuttal of that argument and other supportive propositions 
might have lent greater weight to the majority judgment. 
 All in all, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the majority judgment is less than 
convincing, and that giving prominence given to the liberty rather than equal protection 
dimension of the issue was a poor strategic choice. Happily however for the majority of the 
Court, the reasoning offered up by the dissentients has even less to commend it. 
  
 
The dissenting judgments 
 
 Working perhaps on a the basis that multiple individual dissents carry more weight than a 
single opinion, Roberts CJ and Scalia, Thomas and Alito JJ all offered their own judgments. 
The Chief Justice produced a (for the most part) carefully reasoned and expressed dissent, 
which identified some obvious shortcomings in the majority’s opinion, albeit without 
acknowledging the weaknesses in its own position.  The three other dissents, in contrast, are 
notable primarily for their heady mix of petulance and irrelevance, and could be thought to 
serve primarily to undermine such cogency as Roberts CJ’ opinion might possess. 
 
 
Roberts CJ 
 
“Understand well what this dissent is about: It is not about whether, in my judgment, the institution of 
marriage should be changed to include same-sex couples. It is instead about whether, in our 
democratic republic, that decision should rest with the people acting through their elected 
representatives, or with five lawyers who happen to hold commissions authorizing them to resolve 
legal disputes according to law. The Constitution leaves no doubt about the answer”.58 
 
 The crux of the Chief Justice’s critique of Kennedy J’s opinion is presented as lying not – 
crudely – in a question of substantive morality (ie who should be allowed to marry), but in a 
question of the separation of powers (ie which governmental institutions should be 
empowered to determine which aspects of that substantive moral issue). The analysis 
proceeds from the premise for several hundred years both Congress59 and the States have 
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been controlled by lawmaking majorities which have only conceived of marriage as 
encompassing opposite gender partners; and that the matter to be resolved is how departures 
from or modifications of that traditional understanding should properly be achieved. 
 Simply put, any legal ‘right’ that individuals might have to marry a person of the same 
gender is a right that can be derived only from State law – whether from the State constitution 
or legislation or common law. As legal communities, operating within specific geographical 
boundaries, States may (subject only to narrowly defined Fourteenth Amendment 
restrictions) allow or prohibit such marriages as they each think fit. And it is open to 
individuals who dislike the substance of the legal choice made in their home State to move to 
State with laws more to their liking or to stay put and make efforts to have the unwanted law 
changed. 
 Roberts CJ’s ‘liberty’ is a mechanism to safeguard long accepted values against newly 
emergent majoritarian threats. The accepted ‘liberty’ in issue in Meyer v Nebraska  was to 
teach one’s children a foreign language: in Pierce it was to educate one’s child in a private 
school. Such choices, even from the Meyer/Pierce perspective of the 1920s, were properly 
seen to stretch back to and beyond the revolutionary era.  
 Because there is no such traditional basis in respect of marriage between same sex partners, 
majoritarian denial of such marriages cannot infringe a liberty interest. For Roberts CJ, that 
spouses be of opposite genders is not simply a deeply rooted element of marriage, but an 
irremovable core. On this reasoning, same sex marriage could eventually become sufficiently 
‘traditional’ that it would amount to a liberty interest, but that state of affairs  lies many years 
in the future. 
  Roberts CJ obviously accepts that ‘traditional understandings’ can be altered by 
constitutional amendment. Nor does he suggest that Loving, or Zabrocki or Turner mis-stated 
the restrictive effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on State autonomy on the question of who 
might get married at all (and to whom). Roberts CJ’s position is rather that those cases were 
decided without any doubt being cast on the correctness of the assumption that marriage 
could only be a male/female relationship. As such, they provide no authority in the proper 
legal sense for the conclusion that ‘liberty’ embraces same-sex marriage. 
  He is similarly dismissive of the contraception and privacy cases as an authority for such a 
proposition: in part because (obviously) the State laws in issue there were directed at mixed 
sex couples; and in part because the laws purported to impose criminal penalties on the 
targeted individuals. Similarly, Lawrence is seen as irrelevant because – notwithstanding it 
forbids discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation – that protection is limited to a 
freedom from criminal sanctioning of an essentially private (intimate) act. Proponents of 
same sex marriage in contrast: “….do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite, they seek public 
recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding government benefits”.60 
 If there is no ‘liberty’ in issue, it is therefore open to the States to deny same sex partners the 
right to marry each other as long as such policy can be shown to have a rational basis: “And a 
State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture 
throughout human history can hardly be called irrational”.61 In short, the gist of Roberts CJ’s 
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dissent is that the majority has improperly taken the court into the legislative arena, and 
thereby resolved an essentially political dispute through legal means. 
 To that point, the Chief Justice’s argument has an obvious credibility. That credibility is 
eroded somewhat by the simplistic assertion – embraced to some extent as noted above by the 
majority as well – that the majority decision is necessarily ‘anti-democratic’. But where the 
dissent most loses force is in Roberts CJ’s attempts to bolster his more abstract criticism with 
reference to historical precedent, by equating the majority decision in Obergefell with the 
‘majority’ views in two of the Court’s most controversial judgments: Dred Scott v Sandford62 
and Lochner v New York.63  
 The reference back to Dred Scott is quite extraordinary. In part, this is because of simple 
error. Roberts CJ assets for example that ‘the Court’ in Dred Scott held that the Fifth 
Amendment protected a slaveowner’s liberty to take his slaves into the territories and keep 
them there against Congressional legislation. That assertion is – as Roberts CJ must surely 
know – just plain wrong.  Taney CJ offered up that idea (almost in passing) in his leading 
judgment, but his comment was concurred with only by two other members of the court. 
More broadly, Roberts CJ’s reference to Dred Scott is quite bizarre because what was 
accepted by the majority of the court was that (most) blacks could not be citizens of the 
United States because they had for many years (before, during and after the revolution) been 
regarded as inferior beings by whites.64 They were not – to return to a point flagged above – 
‘individuals’. We might perhaps pause to recall Taney’s words: 
 
“It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race which prevailed 
in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when 
the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation 
displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery 
for his benefit….. 
….[A] perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one which 
they had reduced to slavery. And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and 
the slave, but this stigma of the deepest degradation was fixed upon the whole race”.65 
 
and then wonder if they could be applied - in a diluted sense of course - with some felicity to 
majoritarian sentiments towards gay Americans in the recent past. In denying legitimacy – 
and of course legality - to the continued stigmatisation of a minority group by the majority, 
Kennedy J’s judgment is in its most important respect entirely antithetic to ‘the court’s’ 
decision in Dred Scott. 
 The Chief Justice’s invocation of the 1905 judgment in Lochner perhaps does less – but still 
some - damage to the cogency of his argument. In Lochner, a 5-4 majority invalidated New 
York legislation which sought to place a ten hour per day maximum on working hours in, 
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inter alia, bakeries. Roberts CJ is manifestly correct in portraying the majority decision in 
Lochner as ‘discredited’. However he misses - or perhaps chooses not to mention – the rather 
obvious difficulty in seeking to equate that majority decision with the majority view in 
Obergefell. 
 The analogy is patently flawed. The intention of the New York legislature in 1897 was to 
protect an economically weak minority of employees from exploitation by their economically 
much more powerful employers. The Lochner majority of course portrayed that law as one 
restricting the liberty of employees to work (if they ‘chose’) eleven, twelve or more hours per 
day. Whether through ignorance or mendacity, the Lochner majority closed its eyes to the 
political realities which the law addressed. The State initiatives in issue in Obergefell could 
hardly be portrayed as protecting a weak minority – their purpose is further to disadvantage 
that minority; and, in States where the relevant law takes the form of a constitutional 
amendment requiring a super-majority, to entrench that disadvantage beyond the ordinary 
political process. The majority decision in Lochner perpetuated oppressive conduct; the 
majority decision in Obergefell ends oppressive conduct.66 
 
 
Scalia J 
 
 The Chief Justice’s decent is however a model of intellectual rigour and linguistic restraint 
when set alongside the splenetic tantrum offered up by Scalia J, who introduces his judgment 
in apocalyptic terms: 
“Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the 
nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest 
extension one can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create “liberties” that the Constitution and its 
Amendments neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, 
always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People of the most important 
liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to 
govern themselves”.67 
 Scalia of course muddles the notion of ‘the People’ with the country’s various 
geographically discrete lawmaking majorities which act through legislation or constitutional 
amendment under State constitutions. These are not ‘the People’. They are ‘mini-Peoples – 
(often) teeny tiny minorities of ‘the People’. It remains entirely open to ‘the People’ to decide 
that the Court has lent the national constitution an unacceptable meaning, and to alter the 
constititution accordingly: “No State nor the Congress nor the President nor any federal court 
nor any federal executive body shall ever permit nor recognise as a marriage any legal 
relationship between two persons if those persons are of the same gender” might be a form of 
words that does the trick.  And so long as the mini-Peoples of the three quarters of the States 
can simultaneously coalesce in support of such sentiments, then the ‘political’ process will 
have settled the issue until such time as sufficient mini-Peoples coalesce in favour of a new 
settlement. 
 Scalia J’s hysteria is repeated in a passage in which he accuses the majority of being: 
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“…willing to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres to what was, until 15 
years ago, the unanimous judgment of all generations and all societies, stands against the 
Constitution.”68 
 
 This is just the silliest of things to say. It is – and one might has always been – a tenet of the 
constitutional settlement that any person or groups of people are ever at ‘liberty’ to seek to 
have the constitution amended; so long as that is done in an orderly, peaceful (and one 
hesitates to say it ‘democratic’) fashion. On this reasoning – one wonders how Roberts CJ 
would treat the point - anyone who suggested Dred Scott or Lochner was wrongly decided – 
‘stood against the Constitution’. The premise is nonsensical. 
  Scalia J may be a judge of formidable intellect and learning. Opinions such as the one he has 
produced in Obergefell do little to buttress any such conclusion. The similar sentiments of 
Thomas and Alito JJ do not merit separate attention. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Roberts CJ, alone among the dissentients, also suggests that he might have formed part of 
the majority had its conclusion rested on the narrowly formulated (and adequately evidenced) 
basis that the impugned State laws violated the equal protection clause because they denied a 
range of fiscal or legal benefits to gay couples. It is perhaps unfortunate that the case was not 
argued and resolved on that basis. A 6-3 majority, carrying George W. Bush’s nominee as 
Chief Justice, would have lent the judgment greater legitimacy than the 5-4 balance we have 
been given. 
 The Supreme Court’s (unanimous) decisions69 in Brown v Board of Education were of 
course met with ferocious resistance in many southern States and with deliberate 
obstructionism in many other parts of the country.70 Thus far, there is little indication that the 
‘defeated’ States on the marriage issue will offer either formally or informally any such 
obstructionism. In that practical sense, the legitimacy of the majority judgment is not 
seriously in question. 
 In the immediate aftermath of Obergefell, some headlines were made by a woman named 
Kim Davis, a county registrar in Kentucky: 
 
“MOREHEAD, Ky. — Defying the Supreme Court and saying she was acting “under God’s authority,” a 
county clerk in Kentucky denied marriage licenses to gay couples on Tuesday, less than a day after the court 
rejected her request for a dely. 
A raucous scene unfolded shortly after 8 a.m. at the Rowan County Courthouse here as two same-sex couples 
walked into the county clerk’s office, followed by a throng of journalists and chanting protesters on both sides 
of the issue. One couple, David Ermold and David Moore, tried to engage the county clerk, Kim Davis, in a 
debate before the cameras, but as she had before, she turned them away, saying repeatedly that she would not 
issue licenses to any couples, gay or straight. 
“Under whose authority?” Mr. Ermold asked. 
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“Under God’s authority,” Ms. Davis replied”.71 
 
  Davis’ defiance was in notable contrast to the welcome afforded to the judgment by the 
current incumbents of senior State executive office in Kentucky, all of whom uniformly  
pledged to facilitate its effective implementation.72 Davis was subsequently jailed by a 
federal court for five days for contempt of court in refusing to issue marriage licences.73 A 
rally celebrating her release was attend by two Republican presidential candidates, Senator 
Ted Cruz of Florida and former Arkansas Governor, Mike Huckabee. The issue will certainly 
retain some political traction into and beyond the 2016 electoral cycle, particularly on the 
basis that government officials who are opposed on religious grounds to gay marriage should 
not be compelled to issue marriage licences to gay couples,74 but there is little indication that 
gay couples will meet serious official obstacles should they wish to marry in the meantime.75 
  It is therefore tempting to conclude that may well find that in ten years time the notion that a 
man might marry a man and a woman a woman will have become so normalised in so many 
parts of the United States that the class of 2027 will look back at Obergefell and wonder what 
all the fuss was about. It will no doubt be a case taught in law schools and discussed in law 
journals as vehicle to explore the contesting principles of judicial ‘activism’ and ‘restraint’. 
As such the judgment(s) will remain important elements of constitutional jurisprudence. But 
it should perhaps be hoped that those questions of doctrinal theory do not obscure the 
profoundly important impact of the judgment in freeing a long stigmatised and discriminated 
against minority of ‘The people’ from the second class legal and cultural status they had been 
explicitly assigned by their respective States’ intolerant legislative majorities. Richard Posner 
puts the point perfectly in Baskin v Bogan:76 
Wisconsin's remaining argument is that the ban on same-sex marriage is the outcome of a democratic process—
the enactment of a constitutional ban by popular vote. But homosexuals are only a small part of the state's 
population—2.8 percent, we said, grouping transgendered and bisexual persons with homosexuals. Minorities 
trampled on by the democratic process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional law. 
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